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Why Has the Issue of Capital Flows to 
Emerging Markets Surfaced Again? 
The expansion of global liquidity1 in response to the financial 
crisis and the consequent low interest rates in advanced econo-
mies have restarted large capital flows to emerging markets. 
Because of weaker bank lending though, overall capital flows 
Dealing with the Challenges of Capital Inflows in the Context of  
Macrofinancial Links 
Swati R. Ghosh
JUNE 2010 • Number 19
to emerging markets are still below 2008 and 2007 levels (see 
table 1). 
Policy Challenges Presented by These 
Capital Flows
Capital inflows, and capital mobility more broadly, can yield 
many benefits: allow countries with limited savings to attract 
In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, emerging markets have seen a significantly higher degree of volatility in their 
capital flows. At the onset, all countries experienced sudden stops and increases in risk premia. Following this initial period of 
uncertainty, financial markets began to differentiate between the countries, and while most developing regions have regained access 
to both debt and equity issuance, the pace of recovery of capital inflows has been particularly remarkable for some countries. 
Given the likelihood that the prevailing low interest rates in the developed world will remain for some time to come, and given the 
prospects of faster growth in emerging markets, it is likely that some emerging markets will experience significant surges in capital 
flows in the near future. This note examines potential policy responses to maintain macroeconomic and financial sector stability in 
the face of increased capital inflows.
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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
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Table 1. Gross Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (US$ billions)
2008 2009 2010
Capital flows Q1 Total Q1 Total January February March Q1
Total 103 390 48 353 33 17 44 94
  Bonds 12 65 18 115 21 5 21 48
  Banks 71 257 22 129 4 5 10 19
  Equity 20 68 8 109 7 7 13 27
Latin America 19 90 21 137 9 4 16 29
  Bonds 5 20 10 62 8 2 10 19
Eastern Europe 36 157 6 72 12 2 9 24
  Bonds 2 35 4 33 7 1 8 17
Asia 38 98 18 122 12 7 14 33
  Bonds 3 7 5 16 7 2 0 9
Others 11 45 3 22 0 3 5 8
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financing for productive investments, foster the diversification 
of investment risk, and contribute to the development of finan-
cial markets. 
Nonetheless, capital inflow surges can be of concern to recipi-
ent economies. The current surge of inflows is likely to have a 
sizable transitory component to them because a major driver is 
the low interest rates in advanced countries that will most likely 
be reversed in the near future. Capital flow volatility can trans-
late into significant macroeconomic volatility in the domestic 
economy. Even when capital inflows may be of a more perma-
nent nature, reflecting equilibrium conditions, they can compli-
cate macroeconomic management and entail tradeoffs in attain-
ing macroeconomic objectives. 
Large surges in capital inflows can lead to strong upward 
pressure on the exchange rate and contribute to macroeconom-
ic overheating, widening current account imbalances through 
an appreciating exchange rate  as well as inflationary pressures 
and asset price bubbles to the extent that a nominal exchange 
rate appreciation is resisted and monetary sterilization is either 
not undertaken or is ineffective (box 1). The financial sector 
generally plays an important role in amplifying these asset price 
bubbles and can exacerbate macroeconomic challenges. And in 
the process, the financial itself sector can become vulnerable, 
particularly in the context of weak institutions. If financial 
markets are segmented—as is the case in many emerging mar-
kets to the degree that some borrowers can only access external 
borrowing through the banking system, then a “credit chan-
nel”2 may be operative, meaning that changes in bank credit 
can  influence  investment  or  consumption  (Bernanke  and 
Blinder 1988, 1992). Specifically, inflows into the banking sec-
tor that are then extended as credit to the private sector can 
lead to the validation of demand that would otherwise be li-
quidity constrained (see figure 1). In other words, banks can 
further exacerbate macroeconomic cycles. Even if some banks 
are unable to borrow or issue bonds abroad directly—as is likely 
to be the case with smaller domestic banks—these banks may 
play a role indirectly. This can happen if residents who are able 
to raise funds abroad then deposit their externally borrowed 
funds in these domestic banks, and if these smaller banks then 
extend credit to firms and consumers who would otherwise be 
liquidity constrained. Moreover, because banks are only re-
quired to hold a certain proportion of their funds in reserve, 
the money supply multiplier operates so that banks can extend 
credit by several times of any initial increase in deposits. Be-
cause banks direct much of their credit to sectors such as real 
estate and the stock market, they also play a role in asset infla-
tion, which can occur with inflows of private capital. If asset 
price inflation leads to an increase in the collateral value of 
banks’ clients, against which banks lend, the cycle can be rein-
forced. Bank portfolios and balance sheets can become vulner-
able with exposure to risky sectors (for example, real estate, 
foreign exchange, and maturity mismatches; box 1).
Appropriate Policy Responses Are  
State Contingent
Macroeconomic Policies3
Given the potential impacts of capital inflows, countries gener-
ally have three objectives: i) avoiding domestic macroeconomic 
overheating; ii) avoiding a buildup in financial sector fragility; 
and iii) avoiding a loss of competitiveness through exchange 
rate appreciation, which is of particular importance when the 
surge in capital flows is deemed likely to be temporary. So what 
are some of the policy options available? Not surprisingly, the 
policy options depend on the prevailing domestic macroeco-
nomic conditions and the key objectives (see figure 2). A combi-
Box 1. Examples of Capital Inflows and Banking Sector 
Vulnerability 
Foreign exchange (FX) mismatches: Following the surge 
in capital inflows into East Asia in the early to mid-1990s, 
there was a rapid increase in FX exposures (with the ratio 
of FX liabilities to FX assets) of the banking systems in 
several  countries,  including  Thailand,  Indonesia,  and 
Malaysia.
Figure B.1. Ratio of Banks’ FX Liabilities to FX Assets
Maturity  mismatches:  Using  bank  level  data  from  18 
emerging  economies,  Aysun  (2006)  investigates  the 
impact of capital flows on bank’s maturity mismatches 
and  finds  a  statistically  significant  positive  relationship 
between the two and that further maturity mismatches 
play  a  key  role  in  determining  external  vulnerability. 
Specifically,  the  study  finds  that  maturity  mismatches 
increase  significantly  during  periods  of  high  capital 
inflows and banks with high maturity mismatches report 
larger losses if there is a capital reversal—despite being 
more profitable in more tranquil periods.
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nation of policies should be used to avoid excessive tradeoffs in 
its macroeconomic objectives. For example, a country may be 
able to sustain some appreciation of the exchange rate and un-
dertake some sterilization and some fiscal tightening to achieve 
its exchange rate and domestic macroeconomic objectives.
Exchange rate adjustment. Allowing the exchange rate to ap-
preciate may be the first policy option for a country with an un-
dervalued exchange rate. Allowing the exchange rate to adjust 
toward its equilibrium rate can mitigate the transmission of glob-
al liquidity and capital inflows. An exchange rate appreciation in 
countries where the exchange rate is not misaligned, however, 
can have significant repercussions on the economy, particularly 
on the competitiveness of the tradeables sector. And in countries 
with a fixed exchange rate regime, the need to preserve the cred-
ibility of the exchange rate peg may preclude the policy option of 
a temporary change in the exchange rate level. 
Intervention in the foreign exchange market. If losing compe-
tiveness is a concern, and the exchange rate is not undervalued, 
countries may intervene to keep the exchange rate at the cur-
rent level or to slow the appreciation. Intervention may also be 
useful in economies that need to increase their reserves. How-
ever, if inflation and domestic macroeconomic overheating are 
a concern, sterilization of the liquidity injected by interven-
tions may be necessary. But sterilization can be costly: the dif-
ference between the interest rate paid by the central bank to 
the commercial banks to drain liquidity and the interest rate 
received on official reserves will likely reduce central bank 
profitability, especially under high global liquidity conditions 
that keep interest rates in advanced economies low. Moreover, 
sterilization may: i) elicit further inflows by maintaining the 
differential between domestic and international lending rates, 
particularly if the market expects an appreciation of the ex-
change rate—and the flows are likely to be short-term flows that 
are more responsive to interest rate differentials; ii) encourage 
domestic borrowers to switch to foreign currency borrowing 
and liabilities, potentially raising financial stability concerns; 
and  iii)  be  limited  by  the  size  of  the  country’s  financial 
market.
Fiscal policy. Fiscal tightening can support tight monetary 
policy by reducing the budget’s financing needs and thus allow-
ing for lower domestic interest rates (and less incentives for 
capital inflows). Fiscal tightening could also mitigate asset bub-
Figure 1. Interaction of Capital Inflows, the Macroeconomy, and Financial Sector Concerns
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bles directly by reducing aggregate demand growth and sup-
porting a capital account adjustment. However, significant fis-
cal adjustment is not always feasible at the necessary time and 
may involve a lag. 
Imposition of capital controls. When available macropolicy 
options are not sufficient, or cannot provide a timely response 
to an abrupt or large surge in capital inflows, capital controls 
may be a useful tool. However, the efficacy of capital controls 
may be of limited duration; empirically, capital controls have 
been found to enable countries to initially reduce the pressures 
on the exchange rate and to maintain a difference between do-
mestic and foreign interest rates, but over time, countries were 
generally not able to achieve both the interest rate and exchange 
rate targets. Moreover, to be effective even for a limited dura-
tion, controls need to be comprehensive and need to be force-
fully implemented. Capital controls have also been found to be 
more effective in affecting (lengthening) the maturity of the 
flows and generally less successful in affecting the overall mag-
nitude of the flows. Such controls tend to lose effectiveness 
when the return on the controlled transaction exceeds the cost 
of circumvention, providing the incentives for market partici-
pants to circumvent the controls, which is easier to do in coun-
tries with more developed and sophisticated financial markets. 
Hence,  capital  controls  may  be  best  used  in  circumstances 
where the surge in inflows is deemed to be driven by factors 
that are likely to quickly reverse.
Prudential Regulation and Supervision to Reduce Financial 
Sector Vulnerability
Empirical evidence suggests certain types of capital inflows can 
make a country vulnerable to financial crisis. In particular, as 
already discussed, flows intermediated through the banking 
sector can fuel credit booms, asset price bubbles, and foreign 
exchange lending, with the banks themselves becoming vulner-
able in the process. 
The objective of strengthened prudential regulation and su-
pervision is to reduce financial sector vulnerability and limit 
systemwide distress to avoid potential output losses associated 
with financial instability. Traditionally the focus has been on 
microprudential regulations, that is, regulations that concen-
trate on individual financial institutions, such as certification 
of those working in the financial sector, rules on how financial 
institutions operate, and measures to ensure stability of the in-
dividual financial institution. 
Increasingly—particularly following the onset of recent global 
financial crisis—attention has turned to the importance of mac-
roprudential policies and regulations. Macroprudential policy 
can be defined as policies that focus on the financial system as a 
whole and treat aggregate risk as partly endogenous with respect 
Figure 2. Macroeconomic Policy Responses Depend on Macroeconomic Objectives and Constraints
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to the collective behavior of financial institutions. A macropru-
dential approach recognizes the interdependence and endogene-
ities in the system that can lead financial institutions to behave 
homogenously, and in turn, reduces the resilience of the finan-
cial system. The premise underlying macroprudential regula-
tions is that relying on individual bank regulation and supervi-
sion  at  a  microlevel  is  not  sufficient.  Indeed,  in  some  cases 
microprudential  regulations—in  as  much  as  they  can  some-
times encourage homogenous behavior of institutions in peri-
ods  of  distress—can  exacerbate  the  problem.4  As  Persaud 
(2009a, 20) stresses:
Wherever possible micro prudential regulations need to be 
designed in a way that minimizes macro-prudential conse-
quences and, given that this will not always be possible, micro-
prudential regulation must be complemented with macro-
prudential regulations. 
The macroprudential (or systemic) regulatory frameworks 
have two dimensions: first, managing cross-sectional risk distri-
bution across the financial system at any given time and second, 
addressing the evolution of the aggregate risk over time. The 
challenge in the first dimension is to deal with common (related) 
exposures to similar asset classes or links among them. The key 
issue of the second dimension is to deal with pro-cyclicality, or 
how systemwide risk is amplified over the credit cycle, by interac-
tions within the financial system as well as between the financial 
system and the real economy. “During expansions, declining risk 
perceptions,  rising  risk  tolerance,  weakening  financial  con-
straints, rising leverage, higher market liquidity, booming asset 
prices and growing expenditures mutually reinforce each other, 
potentially leading to the overextension of balance sheets” (Borio 
2009). Dampening the pro-cyclicality of the financial system is 
increasingly being regarded as a priority (Brunnermeier et al. 
2009; Calomaris 2009; Mayes, Pringle, and Taylor 2009; De 
Larosiere Group 2009; G-20 2009; FSF 2009). 
Countercyclical macroprudential regulation can be intro-
duced either through banks’ provisions and/or through their 
capital. It is important that this be accomplished using simple 
rules  to  ensure  that  regulators  cannot  relax  them  in  boom 
times. 
Introducing countercyclical bank provisions has already oc-
curred in Spain and Portugal. The Spanish provisioning system 
requires higher provisions when credit grows more than the 
historical average, linking provisioning to the credit cycle. Un-
der this system, provisions built up during an upswing can be 
accumulated in a fund which can then be drawn down in a 
slump to cover loan losses. This counters the financial cycle as 
it discourages (but does not eliminate) excessive lending in 
booms and strengthens the banks during bad times. Counter-
cyclical bank regulation can also be introduced via capital re-
quirements. Table 2 lists several proposals for dealing with 
cross-sectional or pro-cyclical risks.
Summary
The benefits of capital inflows notwithstanding, large surges of 
capital inflows can pose challenges to macroeconomic and fi-
nancial sector stability. The appropriate response to deal with 
the challenges posed by large capital inflows depends on the 
specific country conditions. The recent financial crisis has also 
highlighted the importance of broadening the toolkit to in-
clude macroprudential regulations as well as the traditional 
microprudential regulations to safeguard the macroeconomic 
and financial sector stability. Much of the debate now centers 
on exactly how these macroprudential regulations should be 
Objective: To reduce the risk of pro-cyclicality
Automatic or indexed increases in capital adequacy of institutions when aggregate borrowing (or some other index of systemic riskiness) in an economy or a sector 
is above average (Persaud 2009).
Link capital adequacy to macroprudential factors reflecting maturity mismatches, credit expansion and asset prices, with a multiplicative effect that would be 
greater in a boom than during de-leveraging (Brunnermeier et al. 2009).
Objective: To reduce cross-sectional risk
Impose capital ratios based on the individual institutions contribution to systemwide risks (Borio, Furfine, and Lowe 2001; Brunnermeier et al. 2009). 
Impose capital charges on behavior that is typically common across banks compared to that which is idiosyncratic, that is, areas where banks are susceptible to 
herding behavior and where there is a high correlation of balance sheet risk (for example, real estate lending). This could include loan-to-value ratios for property 
loans or restrictions on income gearing.
Design capital surcharges based on interbank correlations of returns (Acharya 2009).
Design capital surcharges based on co-movements of banks’ risks (for example, co-value at risk; Adrian and Brunnermeier 2009). 
Objective: To reduce systemic risk by better matching of risk taking with risk bearing in the financial system capacity 
Systemic rules to incentivize financial firms to better match risk taking with risk-taking capacity, for example, capital requirements for maturity mismatches 
(administered in a way that reduces also pro-cyclicality).
Table 2. Proposals to Reduce Macroprudential Risks/Consequences
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designed and what changes may be needed in regulatory struc-
tures to implement these regulations effectively.
Notes
1. For the purpose of this article, global liquidity is measured 
by the GDP-weighted average of reserve money and M2 of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Euro area, and Japan.
2. The “credit channel” view also implies that monetary policy 
can work not only through its impact on the bond market inter-
est rate, but also through its independent impact on the supply 
of intermediated loans. For this, three conditions must hold: 
first, intermediated loans and open market operations must 
not be perfect substitutes for some firms on the liability side, 
that is, some firms must depend on bank credit alone for fi-
nancing; second, the central bank must be able, by changing 
the quantity of reserves available to the banking system, to af-
fect the supply of intermediated loans: the intermediary sector 
as a whole must not be able to insulate its lending activities 
from shocks to reserves, either by switching from deposits to 
less reserve intensive forms of finance (for example, certificates 
of deposit, commercial paper, equity, and so forth) or by paring 
its net holdings of bonds.
3. See also background papers on macroeconomic policy responses 
from which this section draws: J. Ostry,  A. R. Ghosh, K. Haber-
meier, M. Chamon, M. S. Qureshi, and D. B. S. Reinhardt, 
“Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls” (IMF Staff Position 
Note SPN/10/04, Washington, DC, 2010); IMF,  “Chapter 4: 
Global Liquidity Expansion: Effects on “Receiving” Economies 
and  Policy  Response  Options,”  in  Global Financial Stability 
Report:Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer 
System (Washington, DC, 2010).
4. For example, selling an asset when it appears to be risky may 
be considered as prudent response for an individual bank and 
is supported by much current regulation. But if many banks do 
this, the asset price will collapse, forcing risk averse institutions 
to sell more and leading to general decline in asset prices, high-
er correlations and volatility across markets, spiraling losses, 
and collapsing liquidity. Microprudential behavior can cause 
or worsen systemic risk (Persaud 2009b).
About the Author
Swati R. Ghosh is a lead economist in the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network at the World Bank, Washington, DC.
References
Acharya, V. 2009. “A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank 
Regulation.” Journal of Financial Stability 5 (3) 224–25.
Adrian, T., and M. Brunnermeier. 2009. “CoVAR.” Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Staff Report No. 348, New York.
Aysun,  U.  2006.  “Capital  Flows,  Maturity  Mismatches  and  Profitability  in 
Emerging Markets: Evidence from Bank Level Data.”  WP 2006-29 Univer-
sity of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised October 2007. 
Bernanke, Ben S., and Alan S. Blinder. 1988. “Credit, Money, and Aggregate 
Demand.”American  Economic  Review,  Papers  and  Proceedings  78  (May) 
435–39.
———. 1992. “The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmis-
sion.” American Economic Review 82 (September)  901–21. 
Borio, C. 2009. “The Macroprudential Approach to Regulation and Supervi-
sion.”  VOX.  www.banquedefrance.fr/gb/publications/telechar/seminaires 
/2009 /280109/borio.ppt. 
Borio, C., C. Furfine, and P. Lowe. 2001. “Pro-Cyclicality of the Financial Sys-
tem and Financial Stability Issues and Policy Options.” In Marrying the 
Macro and Micro Prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability (BIS Papers 
No. 1), 1–57. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.  
Brunnermeier, M., A. Crockett, C. Goodhart, M. Hellwig, A. Persaud, and H. 
Shin. 2009. The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation. Geneva 
Reports on the World Economy 11, ICMB.
Calomiris, C. 2009. “Financial Innovation, Regulation and Reform.” Cato 
Journal 29 (1).
De Larosiere Group. 2009. The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision. De 
Larosiere  Report,  ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_laro 
siere_report_en.pdf.
FSF (Financial Stability Forum). 2009. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on 
Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System. Basel, Switzerland. 
G-20 (Group of Twenty). 2009. “Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strength-
ening Transparency.” G-20 Working Group 1, March. 
Mayes, D., R. Pringle, and M. Taylor. 2009. “Towards a New Framework for Fi-
nancial Stability.” Central Banking Publications, http://www.centralbank 
ing.com.
Persaud, A. 2009a. The Warwick Commission on International Financial Re-
form: In Praise of an Unlevel Playing Field, 20. Coventry, UK: University of 
Warwick. 
———. 2009b. “Macro-Prudential Regulation.” Crisis Response Note 6, IFC and 
World Bank.
World  Bank.  2010.  Weekly  Global  Economic  Brief  No.  45.  DEC  Prospects 
Group, April 15.
The Economic Premise note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on topics related to economic policy. They are produced by the 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the World Bank. The notes are available at: www.worldbank.org/economicpremise.